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DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND THE  
“RACE TO THE BOTTOM” IN  
CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS   
 
Daniel Schwarcz* 
 
 
*** 
This contribution to a symposium on insurance intermediaries analyzes 
insurers’ compensation of independent agents and brokers in consumer 
markets.  It focuses on various forms of “differential compensation,” 
whereby an intermediary’s compensation differs depending on the insurer 
with which the consumer ultimately purchases coverage.  Such differential 
compensation, the article argues, undermines competition among consumer 
insurers with respect to non-price product attributes.  This, in turn, 
increases the risk of a “race to the bottom” in consumer insurance 
markets, as insurers focus on selling the cheapest coverage possible that is 
consistent with legal restrictions.  To address these problems, this article 
suggests that insurers who rely on independent agents to sell consumer 
lines of insurance should be prohibited from paying different rates of 
compensation to different agents for the sale of the same line of insurance.  
*** 
 
In 2004, a series of lawsuits filed by the New York Attorney 
General challenged insurers’ long-standing payments of year-end bonuses 
to insurance brokers.  The lawsuits alleged that these payments, known as 
contingent commissions, created conflicts of interest that undermined 
                                                                                                                 
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. For helpful 
comments, I thank Hazel Beh, Tom Cotter, Sean Fitzpatrick, Kristin Hickman, 
Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Francesco Parisi, Jeffrey Stempel, an anonymous 
referee, attendees of the Insurance Intermediaries panel at the 2008 Annual 
Association of Law Schools, and participants in a research seminar at the 
Department of Risk Management and Insurance at Georgia State University.  This 
symposium piece builds off of my earlier article, Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond 
Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 289 (2007). 
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brokers’ professed loyalty to their clients.1  “If the practices identified in 
our suit are as widespread as they appear to be,” the Attorney General 
stated, “then the industry’s fundamental business model needs major 
corrective action and reform.”2   
Within months of these allegations, the commercial insurance 
industry had indeed changed significantly.  Each of the four largest 
insurance brokers pledged to end their practice of accepting contingent 
commission payments from insurers.3  Because of the concentration of the 
insurance brokerage industry – the three largest brokers, Marsh, Aon, and 
Willis enjoyed more than a 54% market share among the top 100 brokers in 
20044 – this shift dramatically impacted the entire market.  Meanwhile, the 
prominence of these allegations led corporate risk managers and other 
sophisticated insurance purchasers to demand from their brokers 
previously-undisclosed details about contingent commission arrangements.5  
Although many small brokers still accept contingent commissions, many 
other brokers (including the four largest) now publicly tout their refusal to 
accept such commissions in marketing themselves to their clients.6 
                                                                                                                 
1 See generally Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the 
Way to Insurance Market Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3047 (2006) 
(reviewing the trajectory of Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation of contingent 
commissions); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning 
Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2007). 
 
2 Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, New York Attorney Gen., Investigation Reveals 
Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/oct14a_04.html. 
 
3 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 291-92. 
 
4 See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance 
Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 364 (2006). 
 
5 See David Dwanka, Mid-Level Insurance Brokers Defend Contingent 
Commissions Amid Growing Criticism, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2006. 
 
6 Broker Compensation: Hearing Before the New York Ins. Comm’r (2008) 
(testimony of Don Bailey, CEO of Willis) (testifying that Willis does not accept 
contingent commissions because they pose a "clear and obvious conflict of 
interest") available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br_cmp_indx.htm. 
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For all of this reform in commercial insurance markets, virtually 
nothing has changed about the way intermediaries in consumer insurance 
markets are compensated.  In both property/casualty and life/health 
consumer insurance lines, most independent insurance agents continue to 
receive increased compensation from insurers to whom they steer a 
significant amount of business.7  And, unlike sophisticated insurance 
purchasers, most consumers continue to have no real understanding of these 
practices and the impact they may have on the advice that insurance agents 
offer.  
From a doctrinal perspective, this divergence in consumer and 
commercial insurance markets may appear to be perfectly reasonable.  The 
insurance brokers that service commercial insurance markets are generally 
considered to be legal agents of policyholders.8  By contrast, the 
independent insurance agents that populate consumer insurance markets are 
usually described primarily as legal agents of insurers, rather than 
consumers, and therefore have more limited (if any) fiduciary obligations to 
policyholders.9  Consequently, compensation structures that create conflicts 
of interest appear to be more troubling doctrinally in commercial markets 
than in consumer markets.  
But from an economic perspective, the differential reform in 
commercial and consumer insurance markets is bizarre.  Unlike 
sophisticated commercial entities, ordinary consumers generally have 
limited information about the relative quality of different carriers and a 
bounded ability to translate the information they do have into effective 
decision-making.10  As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler recently 
observed, “the benefits from holding . . . insurance are delayed, the 
                                                                                                                 
7 See generally id.; see also Richard W. Cooper, Spitzer’s Allegations of the 
Anticompetitive Effects of Contingent Commissions: A Shot Truly Heard Around 
the World, J. OF INS. REG. 83, 100 (2007). 
 
8 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 56-57 (3d ed. 
2000). 
 
9 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D: LAW OF 
INSURANCE AGENTS § 47.5, at 326 (1998).  See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND 
POLICY 66 (2003); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker 
Liability: Crossing the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002). 
 
10 See Part II, infra. 
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probability of having a claim is hard to analyze, consumers do not get 
useful feedback about whether they are getting a good return on their 
insurance purchases, and mapping from what they are buying to what they 
are getting can be ambiguous.”11  Consumers are therefore much more 
susceptible than commercial purchasers to being steered to insurance 
carriers they would not prefer under ideal market conditions.   
Not only does such steering create mismatches between consumers 
and their insurers, but it undermines the competitiveness of consumer 
insurance markets as a whole.  Although consumer insurance markets are 
ultra-competitive with respect to price,12 they are remarkably non-
competitive with respect to claims handling quality.13  Indeed, many 
consumer insurance markets appear to be characterized by insurer-side 
adverse selection, wherein price competition creates a race to the bottom 
among insurers with respect to claims handling quality.14   This Article 
argues that differential compensation contributes to this insurer-side 
adverse selection.  By corrupting the objectivity of independent agents’ 
advice, differential compensation undermines the primary mechanism by 
which consumers can ordinarily overcome informational and cognitive 
limitations in assessing the quality of complicated financial products.  
As such, this Article proposes that insurers who rely on 
independent agents to sell consumer lines of insurance should be prohibited 
from paying different rates of compensation to different agents for the sale 
of the same line of insurance.  Such reform would be less radical than it 
may initially appear.  Federal regulators have long regulated commissions 
                                                                                                                 
11 CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 76-77 (2008). 
 
12 See J. DAVID CUMMINS, DEREGULATING PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 
2-3 (2002); Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the Property-
Liability Insurance Industry, RAND J. ECON. 375 (1973).   
 
13 See Section II. B., infra.   
 
14 Legal scholarship has long recognized that such price competition can cause 
firms to provide inefficiently poor quality when consumers cannot reliably evaluate 
quality due to information deficits or systematic cognitive limitations.  See 
generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004); 
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas 
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).  
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for the sale of Medigap policies, and they recently announced their 
intention to do the same for Medicare Advantage programs.15  By extending 
these policies to the sale of all consumer insurance policies, lawmakers 
could provide consumers with the same protections that sophisticated 
commercial entities already enjoy.  Even more importantly, they could 
enhance the competitiveness of consumer insurance markets as a whole. 
  
I. INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS AND DIFFERENTIAL 
COMPENSATION 
 
A. INSURANCE AGENTS IN CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS 
 
Consumers can purchase insurance coverage directly from an 
insurer, or through either independent or captive agents.  Captive agents are 
employees of a single insurer and only offer coverage with that carrier.16  
By contrast, independent agents can write business with multiple insurers 
and consequently provide consumers with a choice of carriers.17  Such 
choice can be valuable for consumers, as insurers differ in terms of their 
reputations for claims handling, financial strength, risk management 
services, and scope of coverage offered.18  In addition to these variations in 
                                                                                                                 
15 See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (limiting agent compensation so that first year 
compensation may not be greater than twice renewal compensation, renewal 
compensation must be paid for at least 5 years, and replacement commissions may 
not be greater than renewal commissions for the product); Press Release, Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Proposes New Protections for Medicare 
Beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage and prescription Programs (May 8, 2008) 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ (describing proposed regulation that would 
“require Medicare Advantage organizations to establish commission structures for 
sales agents and brokers that are level across all years and across all [Medicare 
Advantage] plan product types”). 
 
16  HOLMES, supra note 9, at 326. 
 
17 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 375. 
 
18 See id.; Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 296-97.  Independent 
insurance agents market themselves primarily on the basis of their capacity to help 
consumers compare these variations in quality and pricing.  As the website of their 
main trade organization explains, independent agents “work with you to identify 
the insurance . . . that [is] right for you… and use [their] access to multiple 
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“quality,” insurers employ differing underwriting criteria and strategies, 
resulting in price differentials even in highly price competitive 
marketplaces.19   
Consumers may prefer independent agents over captive agents for 
other reasons as well.  First, many insurers do not offer insurance directly 
to consumers or distribute their products through captive agents, meaning 
consumers who want to purchase policies from these insurers must go 
through an independent agent.20  Second, because independent agents 
“own” their customer lists, insurers cannot directly solicit the agent’s 
clients or switch those clients to a different agent.  Some have argued that 
this ownership gives independent agents a comparatively strong incentive 
to serve their clients, though empirical efforts have failed to confirm this 
theory.21   
Of course, there are offsetting costs associated with purchasing 
coverage through an independent rather than captive agent.  First, just as 
some insurers only provide coverage through independent agents, many 
popular insurers, such as State Farm and Allstate, only offer coverage 
through captive agents.22  In general, these insurers tend to be more 
                                                                                                                           
companies to deliver those products.” Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of 
America – Consumer Information, http://www.iiaa.org. A brochure designed by the 
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents similarly explains that “by 
shopping among various companies, your professional agent can find the best 
combination of coverage, price and service -- the best value for your insurance 
dollar.”  National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Straight Talk 
about Choosing a Professional Insurance Agent, 
http://www.pianet.com/Publications/ choosinganagentbrochure.htm. 
 
19 See, e.g., Meg Green, Top of Their Game, BEST’S REVIEW 26 (Dec. 2006) 
(describing how some of the most profitable property-casualty insurers focus on 
underwriting only particularly safe risks, and pass off some of the resulting cost 
savings to their insureds). 
 
20 See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of 
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & ECON. 637, 639 (1996). 
 
21 Helen Doerpinghaus, An Analysis of Complaint Data in the Automobile 
Insurance Industry, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 120 (1991); J. David Cummins & Stephen 
Weisbart, The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Insurance Agency 
Performance (1977) (IMA Education and Research Foundation). 
 
22 See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 638.  
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publicly visible, as large insurers can more easily support a captive 
distribution system and may also have greater advertising incentives.23  
Second, other things being equal, coverage purchased through captive 
agents will tend to be cheaper than coverage purchased through 
independent agents.24  Because captive agents only work with one carrier, 
they spend less time on each sale, meaning that they receive lower 
commissions than independent agents.25  These lower commission rates 
may result in lower premium rates for customers, as studies suggest that 
insurers pass through to consumers most of the cost of agent 
compensation.26   
 
B. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENTS 
 
Independent agents are compensated through standard commissions 
on the premiums consumers pay for their coverage.27  These “ordinary” 
commission rates have always varied based on the underlying line of 
insurance sold, as different lines of insurance require different levels of 
effort by insurance agents.28  But, historically, these commission rates were 
relatively standard within specific insurance lines, as individual insurers 
offered a single commission rate to all agents.  Although new insurers 
                                                                                                                 
23 Id. 
 
24 Itzhak Venezia et. al., Exclusive vs. Independent Agents: A Separating 
Equilibrium Approach, 40 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 443, 444 (1999).  
 
25 See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 648-49. 
 
26 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 380-83. Competing factors, such as 
the improved quality of an insurer’s underwriting criteria which is caused by 
increased premiums, may offset this effect. 
 
27 See id. at 374.  In property/casualty insurance markets, these commissions 
are generally the same each year that a consumer renews a policy, whereas 
commission rates tend to decrease over time for life insurance sales personnel.  
This creates its own conflicts of interest, which are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 
28 See id. at 374-75.  
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occasionally offered above-market rates to break into markets, competition 
ultimately ensured relatively uniform commissions within product lines.29  
In the last few years, the premium commissions that different 
insurers pay independent agents have begun to vary more significantly than 
in the past.  Some insurers now negotiate their commission rates on an 
individual basis with agents, offering higher rates to agents that have 
historically directed a large volume of profitable business to the insurer.30  
As a result, many independent agents receive higher commission rates for 
selling policies from one insurer than another, despite competitive forces.   
Even insurance agents who receive the same premium commissions 
from different insurers may nonetheless receive different contingent 
commissions from those insurers.  Unlike differential premium 
commissions, insurers have long paid contingent commissions to 
independent agents.31 Contingent commissions are year-end bonuses that 
some insurers pay to independent agents based on the performance of the 
agent’s book of business with that insurer.32 Most contingent commission 
contracts link this bonus to certain volume or profitability benchmarks for 
the agent’s book of business.   If the specified benchmarks are met, then the 
insurer pays the agent a contingent commission that usually is calculated 
based on the profitability and/or volume of the agent’s book of business 
with that insurer.33  In life and health markets, agents often receive these 
                                                                                                                 
29 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 301. 
 
30 See, e.g., http://www.chubb.com/marketing/chubb7450.html; MetLife, 
Supplemental Compensation Plan, http://www.whymetlife.com; Rupal Parekh, 
Hartford the Latest to Offer Supplementals as Replacements for Contingent 
Commissions, BUS. INS., 33 (July 2007). 
 
31 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3056 (“Contingent commissions have been 
used by insurers as an incentive mechanism for their agents for a century or 
more.”).   
 
32 Id. 
 
33 In general, the size of an intermediary’s contingent commission is based on 
two variables: (1) the amount of insurance business that a particular intermediary 
refers to the insurer, as measured in total premiums; and (2) the profitability of that 
business, which is usually measured by the insurer’s loss ratio on that business.  In 
most cases, intermediaries are only entitled to contingent commissions if they meet 
threshold levels of both sales volume and profitability.  See Jeffrey Wilder, 
Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial 
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contingent commissions in the form of in-kind benefits, such as vacation 
trips, rather than monetary compensation.34   
However it is structured, differential compensation undermines 
independent agents’ incentives to objectively present consumers with 
information about competing insurance options.35  The reason is simple:  
they incentivize independent insurance agents to steer consumers to carriers 
based on considerations other than those customers’ insurance needs and 
risk preferences.  Most obviously, differential commissions encourage 
insurance agents to steer consumers to insurers who pay the highest 
commissions.  But bec ause differential commissions are almost always tied 
in some way to the volume and/or profitability of the agent’s book of 
                                                                                                                           
Insurance 5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group Working 
Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418061. The loss 
ratio is the “ratio between premiums paid and losses incurred during a given 
period.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (7th ed. 1999). Premiums on both new 
policies and policy renewals are generally treated similarly in these calculations, 
which are almost always made on a yearly basis. Wilder, supra, at 5. In some 
cases, contingent commission arrangements may be based only on volume, not 
profitability. However, “the great majority of the arrangements covering the 
smaller intermediaries is based on the profitability of the business written or 
profitability and volume.” Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 379.  Once 
intermediaries reach these qualifying levels, their commissions typically increase 
with better results along either dimension. See Wilder, supra, at 5. 
 
34 See, e.g., Broker Compensation, supra note 6, at 103-113 (testimony of F. 
James Ginnane) (describing various cruises to the Baltics, Sweden, Montreal and 
elsewhere that MassMutual paid based on annual production, and noting that “all 
of the carriers” he was familiar with offer similar trips), available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br-cmp-tran-buf.pdf.   
 
35 Consumers who purchase insurance via a captive agent have already made a 
decision that they want to purchase their coverage with a particular carrier.  This 
means they will often have already priced out several different carriers and, 
perhaps, asked neighbors or friends about their experiences with those carriers.  By 
contrast, consumers who seek out coverage via an independent agent have typically 
not made any decisions about which carrier best suits their needs.  Although they 
may have had a particular agent recommended to them, they generally do not even 
know which carriers the agent offers, much less the relative characteristics of those 
carriers.  Rather, independent agents offer themselves to consumers as an 
alternative to comparison shopping among different insurers.  They purport to do 
the comparative shopping for the consumer. 
 
732 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
business with an insurer, they may also create more subtle steering 
incentives for agents.36  For instance, they may lead agents to steer 
customers to an insurer that has a minimum-volume requirement on the 
cusp of being satisfied.37  Alternatively, they may cause an agent who 
believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to steer that consumer to an insurer 
with whom the agent does not have a differential commission arrangement 
tied to profitability.38  Differential commissions may also increase premium 
costs for consumers.39   
 
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEGAL RESPONSE TO 
DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION FOR INDEPENDENT 
AGENTS 
  
Differential compensation of sales agents is common, and often 
understood to be relatively benign in many industries and market contexts.  
For instance, salespeople in retail stores may often receive special bonuses 
or in-kind benefits if they reach sales targets for particular products or 
brands.  Like independent insurance agencies, such stores often carry 
multiple brands and consumers may rely on the advice of salespeople in 
making their decisions.  Given that few suggest lawmakers regulate the 
compensation of sales personnel in these contexts, why would a different 
result be warranted in insurance markets? 
Part of the answer is that consumer insurance markets are often 
regulated in ways that would be unthinkable in other markets. For instance, 
state insurance departments regulate product prices and designs and license 
salespeople and insurers.40  Although the desirability of specific regulations 
                                                                                                                 
36 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 297-301. 
 
37 See Wilder, supra note 33, at 19. 
 
38 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89. For this reason, agents who 
steer “high-risk” consumers to certain insurers may theoretically undermine their 
client’s interest by signaling to the insurer that particular consumers are relatively 
“high risk” and should thus be charged increased premiums.  See Schwarcz, 
Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 324-35. 
 
39 See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 383. 
 
40 See generally ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 103 
(1995).  
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is often contentious, the notion that insurance requires robust market 
conduct oversight is generally accepted.  The reasons are two-fold.  First, 
consumer insurance markets are uniquely susceptible to market failure for a 
variety of reasons, including the complexity of the underlying product, the 
cognitive limitations of consumers, the prevalence of information 
asymmetries, and various other external forces that distort the market by, 
for instance, mandating the purchase of coverage.  Second, the 
consequences of such market failure are significant.  Consumers who have 
inadequate coverage typically do not discover that fact until after they have 
suffered a loss, at which point they no longer have the ability to mitigate 
their damages.41     
This Part applies these general rationales for insurance regulation to 
differential compensation arrangements in consumer insurance markets.  It 
concludes the market forces that ordinarily limit the pernicious effects of 
differential commissions are unreliable in consumer insurance contexts.  
Similarly, it suggests that the consequences of the resulting market failure 
are significant, contributing to a race to the bottom over claims-handling 
practices in many consumer insurance lines.   
 
A. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND MARKET FAILURE 
 
In ordinary product markets, an intermediary’s temptation to push 
expensive or high-margin products is counter-balanced by the potential for 
market backlash.42  At least some consumers are likely to arrive at a store 
with some knowledge about competing product options, especially given 
the wealth of such information available on the internet.  This is 
particularly true with big-ticket items – like high definition televisions or 
cars – about which consumers will often invest time in researching.  
Attempts to steer such consumers to inferior or overpriced products may 
backfire, resulting in those consumers shopping elsewhere and sharing their 
                                                                                                                 
41 Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in 
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 505, 583-84 (1998). 
 
42 Howell Jackson, The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in 
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVINGS 
PROGRAMS (Lusardi, Annamaria ed., forthcoming 2009); Howell E. Jackson & 
Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread 
Premiums, 12 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2007). 
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negative impressions with friends and family.43  Although sales personnel 
may attempt to target uninformed consumers, such an approach can be 
risky as it may be hard to distinguish between informed and uninformed 
consumers.  And even consumers that do end up purchasing inferior or 
over-priced products will often fail to discover this in the course of using 
their product.44  Such consumers will not only hesitate before returning to 
the store, but they too may talk to family and friends about their negative 
experience.   
To be sure, these market forces hardly eliminate sales contests and 
inducements that lead to slanted advice – there will always remain sleezy 
car salesmen, stores that sell over-priced and useless gadgets, and chains 
that push consumers to purchase over-priced accessories that add little to 
the overarching product.  But the prospect that routine government 
intervention in these contexts could efficiently improve matters is slim.  As 
this Section shows, these market forces that ordinarily protect consumers 
from excessive steering work poorly in consumer insurance markets.   
 
i. Information in Consumer Insurance Markets 
 
Unlike consumers in most markets, insurance consumers have 
access to few, if any, accurate measures of an insurer’s reliability in paying 
claims fairly and efficiently.45  It is, for instance, impossible for consumers 
to find out how often individual insurers pay claims within 30, 60, 90, or 
120 days of a claim being reported; how frequently they deny claims; how 
frequently they are sued for payment or found guilty of bad faith; and how 
                                                                                                                 
43 For a general discussion of the role of reputation in disciplining sellers’ 
behavior, see Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in 
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981). 
 
44 In economic parlance, insurance policies are thus “credence goods” because 
most consumers cannot evaluate their quality even after they purchase the policy.  
See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 
720-21 (1985) (explaining the differences between search goods, experience goods, 
and credence goods in economic and legal literature). 
 
45 “Information about the reliability of different insurers is hard to come by 
[and] the quality of insurance coverage is almost impossible to assess without an 
expert.”  KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 176 (1986).   
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frequently policies are cancelled or non-renewed.46  While consumers can 
look up how often complaints against specific insurers are lodged with state 
regulators, this data is notoriously unreliable and inconsistent.47 Even the 
data published by Consumer Reports is highly limited, as it does not take 
into account the size and type of each consumer’s claim and it is based on 
each consumer’s subjective experience with the claims process.48  
Although consumers can, and do, carefully scrutinize premium 
differentials from different carriers, the significance of price differentials is 
almost impossible to assess without a corresponding understanding of the 
                                                                                                                 
46  One recent proposal to the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) would empower regulators to publicly disclose most of 
these data elements about the relative quality of insurers’ claims handling, which 
they already collect.  See PROPOSAL FOR CENTRALIZED DATA COLLECTION, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (Market Regulation 
Committee Proposal). Unfortunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal 
under the guise of confidentiality and trade secrets.  See Jim Connolly, NAIC 
Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 25, 
2008, available at http://www.propertyandcasualtyinsurancenews. 
com/cms/nupc/Breaking%20News/2008/09/25-CONDUCTRULE-jc; Chad 
Hemenway, NCOIL Committee Votes Against NAIC Market Conduct Data 
Proposal, BESTWIRE, Jul., 11 2008; Sean Carr, NAIC Sets September Vote for 
Market Conduct Plan, BESTWIRE, Jul. 28, 2008; Letter from Am. Health Ins. 
Plans, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Am. Ins. Ass’n, Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., and Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. to 
Sandy Praeger, President of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (May 27, 2008) 
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_d_data_collection_ 
comments_namic0527.pdf.  
 
47 See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: The 
American and British Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 
735 (2009).  Currently the Market Analysis and Priorities Working Group of the 
NAIC is working to develop better codes for the entire complaint data collection 
effort.  See http://www.naic.org/committees_d_mapwg.htm (last visited February 
8, 2009). 
 
48 Consumer Reports surveys thousands of consumers who filed claims and 
asks them to assess their satisfaction with the claims process.  See Consumer 
Reports Investigates, Surviving the Hard Market in Homeowners Insurance Vol. 
69, Issue 9, Consumer Reports. 36 (Sept. 2004); Homeowners Insurance Report, 
The New Protection Game Vol. 64, Issue 1, Consumer Reports, 16 (Jan. 1999). 
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differences in the underlying products.49    A high-priced insurer may offer 
good coverage for a fair price, while a low-priced insurer may offer 
coverage that is poor, even relative to its seemingly low premiums.  In fact, 
it is precisely for these reasons that independent agents choose to market 
themselves to consumers by focusing on their capacity to offer advice about 
competing carriers.  
This lack of concrete information about the relative quality of 
different insurers undermines a key protection against aggressive steering 
in ordinary consumer markets.  As described above, the fact that consumers 
ordinarily have the capacity to independently research and assess different 
product options limits the capacity of ordinary retail establishments to steer 
consumers to unfavorable deals.  Moreover, it increases the prospect that 
attempting to do so will create market backlash, leading consumers who 
realize they are receiving poor advice to spread the word to others.  But 
because most consumers simply do not have concrete information with 
which to assess the advice about the relative quality of carriers that 
insurance agents dispense, these protections are less robust in consumer 
insurance markets.  This is particularly true given that insurance advice is 
hardly formulaic.  The best insurance options for a customer may depend 
on numerous considerations, including the customer’s risk tolerance, cash 
flow, preexisting relationships with carriers, and numerous other factors.  
This means self-serving advice can often be justified on some basis, and 
will rarely be obviously identifiable, even to experts.   
Not only do consumers have a limited capacity to assess ex ante the 
quality of different carriers’ coverage, but they also have a limited capacity 
to do so ex post.  Unlike almost any other product, only a very small 
percentage of consumers end up using the insurance they purchase.50  When 
they do, it is almost always for relatively small claims, even though the 
most important element of that insurance is the coverage it provides in 
cases of large losses.51  Finally, consumers that do submit claims to their 
insurers are typically ill-equipped to judge the extent to which their insurer 
                                                                                                                 
49 Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 315. 
 
50 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial 
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1413-15 (2007).  
 
51 See id. at 1415.  
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lived up to its legal obligations.52  Consumers may therefore be susceptible 
to insurers’ capacity to “tell a story” that appears to justify the refusal to 
pay a claim or a relatively low settlement of that claim.53   
This limitation in the capacity of consumers to assess insurance 
quality ex post further limits the power of market forces to address the 
steering that may result from differential compensation.  Ordinarily, 
consumers who are successfully directed to inferior or overpriced products 
may discover this fact over time.   Consumers who feel they were so 
victimized can not only choose to shop elsewhere in the future, but can talk 
to family and friends about their experience.  Because most consumers who 
are steered to inferior insurance will never realize this fact, they will not 
exact these market penalties on agents who succumb to the temptation to 
maximize their compensation by directing consumers to inferior 
arrangements.   
  
ii. Consumer Decision-Making about Insurance 
 
In ordinary markets, consumers assess the desirability of different 
product options using a roughly rational process, at least in the aggregate.  
Especially when purchases involve big-ticket items, consumers are often 
willing to invest a significant amount of cognitive energy into making sure 
that they have thought through their options and selected a product that 
meets their needs and desires.  As a result, salespeople can often exert only 
a minimal amount of pressure on shaping consumers’ preferences.   When 
salespeople push inferior or overpriced products, consumers may not only 
resist such practices, but may choose to avoid the establishment in the 
future and tell their friends and families of their experiences. 
Two features of insurance markets substantially undermine this 
reasoned purchasing behavior, and the disciplining impact it has on agents’ 
sales efforts.  First, consumers typically purchase insurance as part of a 
larger event or transaction, such as taking a job, moving, or buying a home 
or automobile.  Unlike with televisions, cars, or refrigerators, consumers do 
not typically decide that they can finally afford a new insurance policy, or 
                                                                                                                 
52 See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, 
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1407-13 
(1994).  
 
53 See id. 
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that their old policy is out of style, obsolete, or run down.54  But the 
bundled decision-making that typifies such insurance purchases is both 
difficult and complicated, resulting in consumers “tend[ing] to adopt 
simpler choice strategies to cope with that complexity.”55  Such simplistic 
strategies obviously enhance the capacity of sales agents to steer consumer 
decisions. 
Second, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that 
consumers’ preferences concerning insurance are remarkably malleable.56  
Experimental research has established that framing effects can have 
important implications for consumers’ purchases of insurance policies.  For 
instance, one study found that subjects were willing to pay more than twice 
as much for flight insurance covering “terrorism” and “mechanical failure” 
than they were willing to pay for flight insurance that would pay for losses 
for “any reason.”57  Similarly, consumers tend to have bimodal responses to 
low-probability, high-cost risks, either dismissing them entirely or 
significantly overweighing their significance.58  Which of these outcomes 
                                                                                                                 
54 Evidence suggests that consumers rarely change carriers after they initially 
purchase a policy, especially outside of the auto insurance context.  INSURANCE 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 5, fig. 2-3 
(reporting that only 7% of homeowners or renters changed insurers in the last five 
years, but 23% of auto insurers did).  When consumers do change insurers, they 
overwhelmingly cite price as the reason.  See id. at 6, fig. 2-4. 
 
55 See Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1223-34 (2003) (reviewing literature 
displaying this consumer tendancy to choose simple choice strategies).  
 
56 Consumers’ decision-making processes about insurance are a complicated 
mix of intuitive, emotional, and rational responses that are susceptible to 
manipulation.  See Horward Kunruether & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-
Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 
63 (April 2005); David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to 
Meet the Practice in Insurance, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 
(2004); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 76-77 (2000).   
 
57 Eric J. Johnson, et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39 (1993). 
 
58 Gary H. McClelland, et al., Insurance for Low Probability Hazards: A 
Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J.  RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 104, 108-09 
(1993). 
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obtains often depends on the availability of the underlying risk.  Thus, 
Californians’ purchases of earthquake insurance generally increase 
significantly immediately after an earthquake occurs and then gradually 
decrease (until the next earthquake).59  Finally, consumers’ insurance 
decisions are significantly impacted by their affection for the item to be 
insured.   In general, people prefer to insure against losses that involve high 
affect, even when holding constant the expected value of the insurance and 
the insured’s level of wealth.60  It is for precisely these reasons that insurers 
are among the heaviest advertisers of any industry.61   
Given this malleability of consumers’ insurance preferences, 
experienced or well-trained sales agents are likely to have a substantial 
capacity to steer consumers to insurers by helping to shape those 
consumers’ preferences.  This form of steering is unlikely to generate any 
market backlash, because it involves altering consumers’ preferences.  
Often, this manipulation unambiguously impedes efficient market outcomes 
by skewing consumer assessments of objective information.  This occurs, 
for instance, with the framing of a risk to increase a consumer’s assessment 
of its likelihood.  At the same time, other types of manipulation may 
admittedly operate on consumer insurance preferences in ways that are 
normatively ambiguous.62  Consider an agent who focuses on a consumer’s 
affection for an item in order to increase her desire to insure against loss to 
that item.  Evaluating the desirability of this result within a consequentialist 
                                                                                                                 
59 See Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small 
Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 249, 252, 254-55 (1977); 
HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY 
LESSONS 26-27, 36-41 (1978). 
 
60 Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in 
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 142-43, 148 (2000).  Entire 
markets for insurance have flourished based on this principle:  consider life 
insurance for children, which in most cases is irrational based on standard 
insurance theory.   
 
61 See Baker, supra note 52, at 1404. 
 
62 See Brett H. McDonnell, Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Evaluations, 
5-6, 9-12 (Oct. 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933089.   
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framework is difficult (if not impossible), because there is no exogenously-
defined preference to serve as a benchmark for that evaluation.63   
 
iii. Insurance Agents’ Discrimination Between 
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Purchasers  
 
In any consumer market, plenty of consumers will be relatively 
uninformed and therefore susceptible to inefficient steering.  But these 
uninformed consumers are typically protected by their more informed 
counterparts.  Because aggressive or misleading sales efforts that are 
directed at informed and engaged consumers can have negative effects on a 
business’s reputation, uninformed or rationally ignorant consumers often 
benefit from the presence of their more informed counterparts when sales 
people cannot distinguish between the two.64 
Once again, though, this market protection against inefficient 
steering is less robust in insurance markets.  Unlike most salespeople, 
insurance agents must discuss clients’ personal situations in order to assess 
their coverage needs and facilitate insurer underwriting.65  This process 
enhances agents’ capacity to assess the relative sophistication of their 
consumers, and to offer advice accordingly.  In fact, one of the earliest 
studies of contingent commission payments found just such a pattern of 
discrimination in a large independent insurance agency in Arizona: 
relatively engaged customers were less frequently directed to insurers that 
paid contingent commissions than customers who were less engaged with 
their insurance purchases.66  Such consumer segmentation undermines one 
                                                                                                                 
63 See id. at 12, 18. 
 
64 Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 
636-38 (1979). 
 
65 Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 318. 
 
66 Id. at 317-18; see Wilder, supra note 33, at 2-3, 5, 7. The agency, which 
remained unidentified, employed eight agents with no ownership stake in the 
company and three “equity agents” who received a portion of the agency’s profits. 
Because the contingent commissions that the company received were paid directly 
to the company, the three equity agents stood to gain more from maximizing 
contingent commissions than the non-equity agents.  Additionally, only the equity 
agents handled “house” accounts, which (1) either originated in another agency that 
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of the core protections against undue steering in ordinary markets: the 
capacity of an informed minority to protect the interests of other 
consumers.67 
 
B. THE COST OF MARKET FAILURE FOR DIFFERENTIAL 
COMMISSIONS  
 
Market failures, of course, are ubiquitous.  And many of these 
market failures are better left alone than subjected to the expensive, and 
often ineffective (or worse), forces of government regulation.   But that is 
not the case here.  This Section argues that insurers’ payments of 
differential compensation to independent agents facilitate a “race to the 
bottom” in consumer insurance markets through insurer-side adverse 
selection.68  They do so by undermining the willingness of independent 
agents to inform consumers about insurers’ claims handling practices or to 
counteract consumers’ tendency to discount the value of quality claims 
handling.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
the company subsequently acquired or were originally handled by an agent who 
retired, and (2) did not fit the portfolio or expertise of any non-equity agent.  The 
defining characteristics of these house accounts strongly suggest that they were less 
sensitive than other agency customers to the level of service they received from 
their agent.  This hypothesis was corroborated by the fact that house accounts were 
three times more likely than other accounts to pay their premiums directly to their 
insurer, rather than to pay them through the agency, indicating disengagement with 
their insurance agent.  The study concluded contingent commissions significantly 
impacted the recommendations that the equity agents gave to their less responsive 
consumers, finding that “the prospect of contingency fees [led] equity agents to 
increase the frequency with which they place house accounts with insurers offering 
contingent commissions by more than 50%.”  Id. 
 
67 See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1406-08; R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, 
Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for 
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 672, 674-75 (1996). 
 
68 BAKER, supra note 9, at 7.  Just as insurer’s lack of information about 
consumers can lead to adverse selection, consumers’ lack of information about 
insurers can lead to the “insurer-side” adverse selection described above. 
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i. Insurer-side Adverse Selection 
   
Part A described how insurance consumers’ limited information on 
the relative quality of different insurance options and suspect decision-
making about insurance can lead ostensibly independent agents to steer 
consumers to inferior insurers.  But these two market conditions can also 
have the more general impact of undermining competition among insurers 
with respect to claims handling.   
If a sufficiently large percentage of consumers are ill-informed 
about insurers’ claims handling, insurers that pursue aggressive claims 
handling strategies (lemons) will profit more than other insurers.  These 
insurers can pass on some of these profits to consumers in the form of 
lower premiums.  In the long run, this will force other insurers to either 
drop out of consumer markets or, more likely, adopt low quality claims 
handling practices themselves.69  By contrast, if a sizable number of 
consumers are cognizant of differences in insurers’ claims handling, then 
some insurers will seek to appeal to these consumers by adopting a high 
price, high quality brand.  That, in turn, could force other market players to 
compete over their own claims handling quality.  Of course, insurers’ 
quality/price mix would still vary, with different insurers appealing to 
consumers with different risk preferences.  As a result, the market as a 
whole would compete along both of the two primary dimensions that define 
the insurance-policyholder relationship. 
Through similar mechanisms, insurer-side adverse selection can 
occur if insurance consumers’ decision-making causes them to under-value, 
or under-appreciate, differences in insurers’ claims handling practices.  
There are strong reasons to suspect consumer decision-making about 
insurance generally has this character.70  The relative value to consumers of 
high quality insurance depends on two considerations: (i) the likelihood 
they will suffer a potentially insurable loss, and (ii) the likelihood a low-
quality insurer will poorly handle any such claim relative to a high-quality 
insurer.  With respect to the former, research has consistently found that 
most people judge their own likelihood of suffering a loss to be lower than 
                                                                                                                 
69 See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 14, at 630, 722, 724-25, 746-47 
(exploring how consumers’ under-estimation of risks can compel a similar race to 
the bottom with respect to those risks). 
 
70 Indeed, research has consistently found that there is a “systematic tendency 
for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.”  Cutler & Zeckhauser, 
supra note 56, at 3. 
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the average such risk, so long as they retain even a minimal amount of 
control over the event.71  Thus, people in general are overly optimistic 
about their risk of being injured in an earthquake,72 being involved in a car 
accident,73 suffering health problems,74 and dying young.75  For these 
reasons, they also generally buy less insurance against these risks than they 
should, especially when no outside force – such as legal mandates or loan 
terms – artificially increases demand.76 
Although less evidence exists as to how consumers evaluate the 
likelihood that a low-quality insurer will poorly handle a claim relative to a 
high-quality insurer, there are theoretical reasons to believe people will also 
tend to under-estimate this risk differential.  In part, that is because 
consumers’ choice of insurers involves precisely the minimal amount of 
control over an ultimate risk (the risk of a low-quality choice having 
negative consequences) that leads people in other contexts to believe their 
                                                                                                                 
71 A separate relevant strand of research has found that, when facing low-
probability risks, people tend to either dismiss those risks entirely or overweigh the 
value of insurance against those risks.   See SLOVIC, supra note 56, at 75, 77; 
McClelland, supra note 58, at 95, 108-109. This conclusion, however, has 
ambiguous implications for the extent to which consumers believe they will suffer 
an insurable loss, depending on the side of the bimodal distribution on which an 
insured risk falls. 
 
72 Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of 
Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to 
the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 40-
1 (1992). 
 
73 David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self Evaluation: The Role of 
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2002); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59, at 240. 
 
74 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).  
 
75 See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should 
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 4, 23 (2001-2002).  
 
76 See id. (noting the vast majority of Americans are under-insured against the 
risk of dying young); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59 (suggesting most Californians 
do not purchase earthquake insurance). 
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risk is lower than the average such risk.77  Additionally, however, the actual 
difference between low and high quality insurers is ambiguous, in that it 
involves numerous considerations that are hard to definitively compare 
across insurers, even with all relevant information.78  Research suggests 
people tend to interpret such ambiguous information in self-serving ways.79  
Given that high quality insurance unambiguously costs more than low 
quality insurance, this bias may theoretically manifest itself in consumers 
dismissing potential differences in claims handling quality.   
Of course, the mere fact that economic conditions in insurance 
markets could theoretically lead to insurer-side adverse selection does not 
make it so.  But many consumer insurance markets do appear to be 
characterized by some degree of insurer-side adverse selection, with few 
insurers pursuing high-quality, high-price strategies.  Aside from the 
common (though often anecdotal) observations of commentators 
acknowledging this equilibrium,80 significant evidence suggests prominent 
national insurers such as Unum/Provident, State Farm, and Allstate have 
each recently engaged in systematic, national efforts to cut claims payments 
                                                                                                                 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 71-76. 
 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 45-53. 
 
79 Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: 
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111 (1997). 
 
80 See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 217 F.3d 1291, 1296 
(10th Cir. 2000) (observing Blue Cross had "a financial interest in denying claims 
in order to remain economically viable as well as competitive within the insurance 
industry"); BAKER, supra note 9, at 128 (collecting specific examples of seeming 
insurer opportunism); Schwarcz,  supra note 50, at 1401-26; John Langbein, Trust 
Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of 
Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2007) (“Even when 
insurance is experience rated, the insurer still has an incentive to deny claims, 
because the market for insurance services is intensely competitive.  Low-cost 
providers prevail over high-cost providers.”).  But see Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” 
Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 405, 418 (1996) 
(arguing that “any insurer who frequently refused to pay covered claims would 
likely soon develop a reputation for behaving in this fashion and lose customers,” 
but acknowledging that “it is plausible that insurers might occasionally behave 
opportunistically without suffering a prohibitive reputational penalty”). 
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to policyholders.81  Additionally, the insurance industry plays a significant 
role in limiting public access to information about different insurers’ claims 
handling quality.  For instance, insurers have collectively devoted immense 
energy and resources to ensuring that data about their claims handling 
quality, which is already collected by state insurance regulators, is not 
made publicly available.82  Similarly, studies of insurer marketing and 
advertising suggest that individual insurers do not publicly advertise any 
concrete information about the quality of their claims handling, preferring 
instead vague and unverifiable promises about trust (as well as concrete 
promises about price, of course).83  In a market where insurers sought to 
compete over the quality of their claims-handling, one would expect that 
some insurers would prominently resist these trends. 
 
ii. The Role of Differential Compensation in Explaining 
Insurers’ Race to the Bottom 
 
As described above, the two economic conditions that make insurer 
side adverse selection a plausible, and seemingly accurate, description of 
consumer insurance markets are (i) consumer ignorance about claims 
handling quality and (ii) under-appreciation of the significance of this 
variable.  This Section suggests that differential compensation of 
independent insurance intermediaries is a key contributor to this 
equilibrium.   
Consumer markets are ordinarily able to overcome informational 
problems through the evolution of a network of independent intermediaries 
that digest complicated data and objectively present consumers with 
advice.84  This process allows consumers to make informed choices that 
                                                                                                                 
81 See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE 
FARM (2008) (displaying State Farm’s practices); Langbein, supra note 80, at 1318-21 
(displaying Unum/Provident’s practices); Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Advocates 
Call for Refunds, Rate Reductions, For Allstate Policyholders After Company Releases 
Internal Documents Revealing Intentionally Underpaid Customers, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 
2008 (displaying Allstate’s practices), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
pressRelease/idUS187467+ 07-Apr-2008+PRN20080407.   
 
82 See documents cited supra note 46.   
 
83 See generally Baker, supra note 52. 
 
84 See Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of 
Middlemen, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (2006) (describing several economic 
 
746 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
 
reflect their risk preferences despite their relative lack of understanding 
about the underlying market.  Just as importantly, it improves the decision-
making of less sophisticated consumers, by influencing insurers’ 
reputations through word-of-mouth among consumers.85   
In the insurance context, objective and independent market 
intermediaries could accomplish these ends by digesting data on claims 
handling quality, along with repeated first-hand observation of insurers’ 
practices, to accurately communicate information about insurers’ claims 
handling practices.  Such information gathering services are particularly 
significant in consumer insurance markets, not simply because of the dearth 
of public information on insurers’ claims handling practices,86 but also 
because few consumers could independently assess such information, even 
if it were publicly available. The quality of an insurer’s claims handling is 
not a monolithic concept, and could be constructed in multiple ways, with 
differences in metrics appearing significant when they were not, or vice 
versa.  For instance, data suggesting an insurer denied a relatively high 
percentage of claims, or a relatively high number of its consumers sue for 
coverage or complain to state regulators, might simply reflect the insurer’s 
pool of policyholders, rather than its claims handling practices.87   
                                                                                                                           
roles for middlemen, including assisting “consumers by reducing the cost of 
product search and evaluation, helping consumers to find the products that best fit 
their needs, and helping consumers to manage risk.”).   
 
85 This role of market intermediaries in filtering and processing information for 
less sophisticated parties has been extensively discussed in debates on the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis, which is often imagined to achieve efficiency through a 
similar market intermediation mechanism.  See generally Susanna Kim Ripken, 
Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in 
Corporate Forward Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929 (2005) 
(discussing the role of market intermediaries in the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis).   
 
86 See supra Part II.A. 
 
87 Insurers have themselves seized on these difficulties in assessing claims 
handling data as one of their primary arguments against public disclosure.  See 
Letter from Wiley Rein to Sandy Praeger, Pres. of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
6 (April 16,2008), available at  http://www.naic.org/documents/committees 
_d_data_collection_comments_namic0416.pdf (resisting the public release of 
market conduct regulation, because “release of the information in raw form without 
the benefit of evaluation and interpretation would be unfair and potentially 
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Just as independent and objective sales agents can improve 
consumer information, they can also improve consumers’ capacity to 
rationally and thoughtfully assess the trade-offs associated with purchasing 
relatively high quality insurance.  By employing “debiasing” strategies, 
intermediaries may be able to counteract the tendency of consumers to 
under-appreciate the value of high quality coverage.88  For instance, 
research suggests that people who are convinced that a potential loss is 
truly random generally no longer perceive they are relatively less likely 
than average to suffer from those losses.89  By pointing out just how little 
control people have over the financial losses that are the subject of 
insurance, independent intermediaries could convince consumers to pay 
more for more reliable coverage.   Similarly, independent agents might be 
able to concretize information about insurers’ relative claims handling, 
thereby limiting the ambiguity of risk differentials that can trigger a self-
serving interpretation of information.  Even if independent intermediaries 
could not neutralize these biases, they might be able to counteract them.90  
For instance, independent agents could attempt to enhance consumers’ 
evaluations of the risks attendant to low quality coverage by vividly 
describing these risks.  Increasing the availability of risks can counteract 
consumers’ tendency to underestimate them.91 
Differential compensation undermines these market intermediation 
mechanisms by distorting the objectivity of the advice independent 
                                                                                                                           
damaging to insurers, and misleading to policyholders, investors, and the public at 
large.”). 
 
88 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199, 204-05 (2006).   
 
89 Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An 
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 307 (1999); David Dunning, 
Chip Heath & Jerry M. Suls, Flawed Self-Assessments: Implications for Health, 
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 69, 80 (2004) (“One 
of the strongest moderators of unrealistic optimism is perceived control.  The 
greater a person’s perceived control over an event or its outcome, the stronger the 
person’s optimistic bias.”). 
 
90 See Johnson et al., supra note 57, at 48. (“[C]onsumers’ decisions about 
insurance can be affected by distortions in their perceptions of risk and by 
alternative framing of premium and benefits.”).   
 
91 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 88. 
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insurance agents offer to consumers.92  Agents’ capacity to mitigate 
consumer ignorance about insurance and debias consumers in ways that 
promote thoughtful consideration of insurance quality depends on agents 
prioritizing the interests of those clients.  When intermediaries are 
incentivized to steer consumers to insurers in order to maximize their 
compensation, they are also encouraged to manipulate consumer 
preferences and impressions to achieve this outcome.  This short-circuits 
the ordinary market solutions to informational and decision making 
problems in complex consumer markets.  As a result, even insurers that are 
interested in cultivating a high-price, high-quality market strategy have 
limited vehicles for effectively communicating this strategy to potentially 
interested consumers.  This creates circumstances under which insurer-side 
adverse selection with respect to claims handling can (and seemingly does) 
flourish.   
 
III. CRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO DIFFERENTIAL 
COMPENSATION 
 
Given the need for reform described in Part II, this Part briefly 
concludes by considering a simple legal intervention in insurance markets 
that resembles measures adopted in the federally-regulated markets that 
relate to Medicare.93  That reform would limit insurer compensation of 
independent agents selling consumer lines of coverage to premium-based 
commissions, and would require insurers to pay a single, flat commission 
rate to all independent agents in their distribution networks.  It would not 
mandate any particular commission rate, allowing insurers to choose the 
rate they wanted to offer to their independent agents.  Insurers could set 
different premium commission rates for different lines of insurance, 
reflecting the fact that different product lines require different levels of 
effort for agents.  Additionally, insurers could pay different commission 
rates to independent agents in different states to account for premium and 
cost of living differences across states.  
Such reform would largely eliminate the distorting potential of 
differential compensation, leaving independent intermediaries without 
significant financial reasons to promote the policies of one insurer over 
another.  Although some insurers might offer slightly higher commission 
rates than others, competition would ensure that these differentials would 
                                                                                                                 
92 See Section II.A, supra. 
 
93 See Press Release, supra note 15. 
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generally be quite small.94  To the extent that differentials in commission 
rates persisted, they would be much less problematic than current 
commission differentials.  Rather than rewarding individual preferred 
agents who steered consumers to a particular insurer, they would reflect an 
insurer’s decision to offer above market commissions to all independent 
agents who sell a particular product line.  As noted earlier, such a strategy 
might be justifiable for new entrants in a market seeking to establish a 
customer base.95  Moreover, a high commission strategy might also be 
sensible for insurers offering high-price, high-quality products if the sale of 
such products requires comparatively more effort.  Indeed, some economics 
literature suggests that sales agents in the consumer electronics industry 
may receive higher commission rates, on a per-dollar basis, for the sale of 
high quality products than low quality products for this reason.96   
Not only would a flat compensation rate for an insurer’s 
independent agents help to solve the problems identified in Part II, but it 
would do so while imposing few administrative costs.  A ban on contingent 
commissions or other specific compensation arrangements, standing alone, 
only invites insurers to design compensation structures that retain the same 
basic incentivizing function, but technically comply with the ban.  Insurers’ 
switch from contingent commissions to “supplemental compensation” 
arrangements, which retain the same performance-based contingency 
structure, is illustrative.97  Because of its simplicity, a mandatory flat rate of 
                                                                                                                 
94 Tacit collusion among insurers in setting commission rates would be 
unlikely, given the number of insurers who rely on independent agents to distribute 
their products. 
 
95 See supra text accompanying note 29 (noting that this was one reason 
historically that insurers offered higher premium commission rates). 
 
96 See Ajay Kalra, Mengze Shi, Kannan Srinivasan, Salesforce Compensation 
Scheme and Consumer Inference, 655 Management Science (2003). 
 
97 See Sally Roberts, Compensation Shake-Up Continues; Chubb Pays $17M, 
Ends All Contingents, BUS. INS., Dec. 25, 2006  (noting that the Chubb agreement 
states that “a fixed commission paid to a producer, set prior to the sale of a 
particular insurance product, and that may be based on, among other things, the 
prior year’s performance of the producer’ is not considered  contingent”).  
Although some have suggested that these newly-emerging arrangements avoid the 
conflicts of interest associated with contingent commissions because they are 
“retrospective rather than prospective,” this argument is unpersuasive.  The fact 
that supplemental compensation arrangements are retrospective merely shifts 
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compensation for all intermediaries avoids this inefficient gaming.  
Moreover, it would be easy to enforce because it would operate on insurers 
rather than intermediaries.  There are obviously fewer insurers than 
intermediaries (making market conduct observation easier) and insurers are 
less likely to engage in outright fraud than individual intermediaries who 
have less to lose from doing so. 
Of course, mandating that insurers pay their independent agents a 
single commission rate is significantly more intrusive than a disclosure-
based response to the problem.  Not only would it be more costly to employ 
than disclosure, but it might distort consumer insurance markets in ways 
that may be hard to measure, or even predict.  Nonetheless, such an 
aggressive intervention is prudent. 
First, merely enhancing the disclosure requirements of independent 
agents is unlikely to mitigate the risk of steering, and the attendant risks of 
insurer-side adverse selection.  Although I develop the limits of a 
disclosure-based regulatory response elsewhere,98 the basic argument is 
simple:  as described above, the reason that market forces do not prevent 
inefficient steering is that consumers generally have a limited ability to 
independently assess their insurance options.   Merely informing consumers 
that their intermediaries may have a conflict of interest does nothing to 
address this fact.  Of course, such disclosure could facilitate an agent’s 
capacity to eschew differential compensation as a marketing technique.99  
But such efforts would be unlikely to prove profitable because consumers 
would have little sense of the value of such neutrality.   
It is for precisely these reasons that compensation practices in 
consumer insurance markets have not, in fact, changed since 2004, despite 
the very public revelation of agents’ conflicts of interest at that time and the 
adoption of mandatory disclosure laws in a number of states since.100  This 
is particularly noteworthy given that numerous intermediaries in 
commercial insurance markets have voluntarily disclaimed differential 
                                                                                                                           
forward the potential pay-off to intermediaries of steering customers to sub-optimal 
insurance.  See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 292.  
 
98 Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1. 
 
99 As noted above, this is precisely what has happened in commercial 
insurance markets. 
 
100 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3064; Cooper, supra note 8, at 100. 
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compensation to recruit and retain new clients.101  Simply put, if potential 
clients are not attuned to the importance of unbiased advice or the ways in 
which advice can be distorted by incentive structures, they will not be 
swayed to change their behavior by competitors’ promises of neutrality.   
In fact, regulations of structurally similar conflicts of interest in 
other industries have often gone beyond disclosure-based strategies for 
precisely these reasons.  Differential compensation of insurance 
intermediaries is one form of a common type of regulatory problem, coined 
a “trilateral dilemma.”102  In a trilateral dilemma, an end-service provider 
compensates a market intermediary in order to induce the intermediary to 
steer consumers’ business to the end-service provider.103  Regulations of 
such side payments often do more than merely require disclosure, for the 
precise reasons developed above.  Examples include prohibitions against 
certain side payments to real estate settlement providers,104 limitations on 
side payments that brokerage firms can pay to investment managers,105 and 
limitations on attorneys’ receipts of side-payments for referrals to other 
attorneys.106  
Second, none of the proposed economic rationales for differential 
compensation appreciably enhance the efficiency of consumer insurance 
markets.107  The most significant such potential benefit of differential 
                                                                                                                 
101 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 
102 See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 312-19; Jackson, supra 
note 42. 
 
103 Jackson, supra note 42.. 
 
104 See 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).  
 
105 See D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The Agency 
Costs to Soft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 82-83 (1994); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 78b (2008).   
 
106 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2(b) (2009). 
 
107 Aside from the enhanced underwriting theory addressed in the text, 
contingent commissions have also been defended because they: (i) may expand 
coverage for non-verifiable losses, Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann, 
Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts 18 (Ctr. for 
Fin. Studies, Working Paper Nov. 24, 2005) available at http://www.ifk-
cfs.de/papers/05 24.pdf.; (ii) protect small agencies, Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 
3042; and (iii) facilitate economies of scale by encouraging intermediaries to work 
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compensation is that it can improve the “front-line underwriting” of 
independent agents by giving them a stake in insurers’ profitability.108  
According to this theory, agents often possess information about the 
riskiness of customers that insurers cannot directly observe, as they interact 
directly with their customers and may have long standing relationships with 
them.  Differential compensation that is linked to insurer profitability gives 
agents an economic reason to convey truthful information to the insurer.  
Alternatively, such compensation may facilitate improved underwriting 
simply by causing an agent who believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to 
steer that consumer to a different insurer that does not pay differential 
commissions.   
Whatever purchase this theory may have in commercial insurance 
markets, it is simply implausible in the context of consumer insurance lines.  
The theory assumes agents do indeed have important underwriting 
information about their clients that insurers cannot observe directly.  But 
insurer underwriting in consumer insurance markets is generally 
standardized and based on simple and easily administrable algorithms.109  
Even if independent agents did possess information that could not be 
captured in an insurance application, it is unlikely that insurers would find 
                                                                                                                           
with fewer insurers, Cummins & Doherty, supra, note 4, at 386-89.  For reasons 
developed in Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 305-11, these 
justifications are not persuasive. A final defense of contingent commissions – that 
they help small insurers to break into the market – is not in conflict with the 
proposal suggested herein, which would permit insurers to offer above-market 
premium commission rates.  
 
108 Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89; see also Regan & Tennyson, 
supra note 20, at 639 (“The agent is the first contact the insurer has with a potential 
policyholder and may be able to obtain information about the customer which 
would be difficult or costly for the firm to verify. It is widely acknowledged that 
agents often employ subjective criteria in evaluating insurance applicants.”). 
 
109 See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 45, at 78 (“[A]n efficient 
classification system does not strive to make its premiums equal expected costs 
beyond the point where that goal is worth achieving.”). RICHARD V. ERICKSON, 
AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 241 (2003) 
(“Individual companies are increasingly less likely to undertake their own home 
inspection or direct field investigations of an applicant.  Instead, more risk 
assessment is centralizing into data system operated by information service 
companies that supply the insurance industry.”).   
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incorporating that information into their underwriting to be cost efficient.110  
This is especially true given the lack of adverse selection in most consumer 
insurance markets.111 
Of course insurance markets, like all markets, change over time.  
Thus, rationales for differential compensation that may not be compelling 
now may prove significant later.  Consequently, any market intervention 
should be accompanied with continued monitoring and supervision.  But 
the need for continuous re-assessment does not absolve lawmakers from 
ignoring conflicts of interest in consumer insurance markets that have been 
addressed in commercial and federally-regulated insurance markets.  The 
failure of state lawmakers to act not only undermines the efficiency of 
consumer insurance markets, but it blunts the claim that consumer 
protection is best secured through the continuation of state-based insurance 
regulation.112   
 
                                                                                                                 
110 See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF 
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 135 (1970) (explaining how insurers must 
adopt easily administrable rules of thumb to operate effectively). 
 
111 See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An 
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224-5 (2004). 
 
112 See, e.g., Press Release, NAIC Still in Opposition to Federal Regulation 
(Jan. 20, 2009) (On file with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners).   
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